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Andrei V. Vernikov1 
 
Russia's banking sector transition: Where to? 
 
Abstract 
This paper applies an analytical paradigm of institutional economics to the transition of the 
Russian banking sector, focusing on the interplay between ownership change and institu-
tional change. We find that the state’s withdrawal from commercial banking has been in-
consistent and limited in scope. To this day, core banks have yet to be privatized and the 
state has made a comeback as owner of the dominant market participants. We also look at 
the new institutions imported into Russia to regulate banking and finance, including rule of 
law, competition, deposit insurance, bankruptcy, and corporate governance. The unfortu-
nate combination of this new institutional overlay and traditional local norms of behavior 
have brought Russia to an impasse – the banking sector’s ownership structure hinders fur-
ther advancement of market institutions. Indeed, we may now be witnessing is a retreat 
from the original market-based goals of transition. 
 
Key words: banking sector reform, privatization, Russia, economic transition, institutional 
economics 
JEL: G21, G28, P34, P37 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa käsitellään Venäjän pankkijärjestelmän muutosta institutionaalisen 
taloustieteen käsitteiden avulla. Pääpaino on pankkien omistuksen ja instituutioiden muu-
toksien vaikutuksessa toisiinsa. Julkisen vallan vetäytyminen pankkisektorilta on ollut epä-
johdonmukaista ja varsin vähäistä. Tärkeimpiä pankkeja ei ole vieläkään yksityistetty, ja 
valtio on itse asiassa lisännyt omistustaan pankkisektorilla. Työssä tarkastellaan myös, mi-
ten Venäjälle ulkomailta tuodut pankkisektoriin liittyvät instituutiot – lainsäädäntö, kil-
pailu, talletussuoja, konkurssit ja yritysten hallintajärjestelmä – ovat toimineet. Näiden 
muualta tuotujen instituutioiden ja Venäjän omien traditioiden yhdistelmä näyttää estävän 
pankkisektorin kehittymisen edelleen. Pankkisektorin omistusrakenne ei edistä markkina-
instituutioiden kehittymistä. Saattaa olla, että pankkisektorin transition alkuperäisistä 
tavoitteista ollaan luopumassa. 
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1  Introduction 
 
This discussion paper assesses the direction and nature of transition in the Russian banking 
sector, focusing on the somewhat overlapping spheres of ownership and institutional. Ow-
nership can be seen as a set of fundamental institutions,
2 while private ownership may be 
treated as the solid core of a market economy that shapes economic institutions. Because 
the challenge for a transition economy is to build new institutions based on private ow-
nership, there is an implied end to the dominance of collective ownership and the resulting 
tensions discussed here. 
  In less than a decade since the financial crisis of 1998, Russia’s banking system has 
emerged from obscurity to become a popular area of study for scholars, experts, and inves-
tors. Researchers typically examine select aspects of the banking system or segments of the 
financial market, often relying heavily on econometric and mathematical models. This 
growing body of literature, however, rarely goes into depth about the interaction of owner-
ship, institutions, and the management of Russian banks. Thus, I would like to pose three 
questions: 
•  What is the Russian state’s current role in banking? 
•  Who will likely control Russian banks in the medium term? 
•  What is the outlook for market institutions ultimately dominating this sector of the 
Russian economy? 
Answers to each of these questions should help us infer the direction of transition. 
Where possible, we compare Russia with other transition economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE),
3 Southeastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the state’s 
role as controlling owner of Russian banks against the backdrop of bank privatizations in 
other European transition economies and China. Section 3 tackles the outcomes of the 
mass-scale import of financial institutions to Russia, examining the bad equilibrium cre-
ated by the mixed-economy model in the banking sector and plausible scenarios of future 
development. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                 
2 Under new institutional theory, “institutions” are not “organizations” but rather the steady social norms and 
rules of conduct, traditions, and behavioral patterns. If institutions are the rules of the game in a society, then 
organizations are the players (North, 1990). 
3 CEE here refers to the eight post-socialist economies in the EU at the time of writing of this paper (i.e. 
ahead of the accessions of Romania and Bulgaria in January 2007). Andrei V. Vernikov 
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I draw extensively on my 14 or so years of experience in the financial sector (includ-
ing stints at the Central Bank of Russia, two international financial institutions, a foreign 
bank subsidiary in Russia, and a major Russian private bank). Naturally, all views ex-
pressed are my own and should not be attributed to any other entity. 
 
 
2   Reassertion of state ownership in the banking sector 
 
2.1  The Russian state as bank owner  
 
The Russian state essentially renounced its monopoly on banking in May 1988 with the 
adoption of the Law on Cooperatives. Two types of banking entities subsequently emerged 
to join the banking system’s nascent second tier. The first group was made up of 
“greenfield” private banks established by private individuals and small business associa-
tions (cooperatives). The second group of “commercial banks” consisted of transmutations 
of local branches of state-owned “specialized banks.” By 1992, second-tier banks repre-
sented 55% of the 1,414 banking entities in existence. Most of these new banks took the 
legal form of joint stock companies, essentially embodying the process of privatizing 
banks and state withdrawal. At the same time, however, the shareholders and owners (en-
terprises, associations, ministries, social organizations, etc.) of these banks were, at least 
nominally, public sector entities themselves.
4 Hence, this metamorphosis of state-owned 
banks took place almost entirely within the public sector. 
Unlike CEE countries, Russia banks were not involved in voucher privatization or 
other privatization schemes. Moreover, state withdrawal was not motivated by poor asset 
quality of state-owned banks or banking crises. Instead, state withdrawal was attained de 
facto through dilution of state-owned stakes, asset-stripping, malicious bankruptcies, and 
other shady methods.
5 Indeed, Russian banking crises in recent years have generally been 
                                                 
4 State ownership loses its classical shape during transition from a communist economy. Industrial and other 
assets neither belong directly to the state nor become private in the legal sense. Stark (1997) proposes the 
term “recombinant property” to reflect special features of ill-defined transitional form of ownership. For our 
purposes here, however, the public-private dichotomy in ownership is preserved. Banks that once belonged to 
the state or any of its subunits are referred to as public property or public sector unless and until there has 
been a formal legal installation of new private owners. 
5 Genuinely private banks experienced brisk growth throughout most of 1990s. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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precipitated by deteriorating liquidity situations (1995, 1998, and 2004) or default on the 
part of the state itself (1998). 
There are no reliable statistical data or bank rankings that might help in calculating 
the relative shares of each sector in total banking assets prior to 2000. Empirical evidence, 
however, suggests that the decline of the combined market share of public sector banks 
from 100% to about 30% ended around 1998. The trend reversed thereafter with the Rus-
sian public banking sector steadily expanding its ownership to over 44% by 2006. The 
Russian state’s reassertion of its presence differs markedly from the general pattern in tran-
sition countries, whereby public-sector ownership in banking declines and then levels off 
(Fig. 1). Five of Russia’s top ten banks are public sector entities. 
 
















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
Sources: Raiffeisen, 2006; author’s calculations for Russia 
 
Official Russian sources put the total share of public sector in banking at 33-34%.
6 
This figure likely reflects a natural bias for understating state holdings. The actual figure is 
likely higher (say, 45%), as e.g. the “Big Four” (Sberbank; the Vneshtorgbank group, 
which includes VTB, its retail subsidiary Bank VTB 24, and Promstroybank; Gazprom-
bank; and Bank Moskvy) in themselves are reported to control 40.7% of Russia’s total 
banking assets (see Table 3 in Appendix).
7 Our approach in designating bank as public or 
private sector is transparent and simple: we search for state organizations, state-owned, and 
state-controlled companies (for which we use an umbrella term broad state) among listed 
                                                 
6 Raiffeisen (2006, p. 49) gives a public sector share of 34.3%, a figure apparently borrowed from official 
Russian sources. 
7 For market shares of individual banks, we rely on rankings by assets regularly published by Interfax and 
RosBusinessConsulting. Andrei V. Vernikov 
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shareholders at individual banks. Obviously, this is not fully effective, given Russia’s lax 
public disclosure standards. 
The first potential source of discrepancy lies in the attribution of sub-federal prop-
erty. In the strict legal sense, municipal authorities do not belong to the state administra-
tion. Nor does the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), which is the main owner of the nation’s 
largest bank (Sberbank). In light of the institutional essence of state structure in Russia, 
however, we consider authorities at all levels, including municipal, as part of the “state”, 
and the banks they own or control (e.g. in Moscow, Tatarstan, and Khanty-Mansiysk Re-
gion) as parts of the public sector. Our second group of borderline cases includes banks 
controlled by nominally private and publicly-listed companies that are in fact state-
controlled. If natural resource and infrastructure monopolies such as Gazprom, Rosneft, 
Transneft, RAO UES, Alrosa, and Russian Railways are regarded as public-sector compa-
nies, then it seems only fair to treat the banks that control them as public-sector entities as 
well. We assess the possible margin of error in allocation of individual banks at no more 
than 1% of total banking assets. 
A breakdown of the Russian banking sector by form of ownership is displayed in 
Fig.2. 
 
Figure 2   Breakdown of Russian banking sector by form of ownership,  













Sources: author’s calculations and estimates based on CBR data 
* foreign ownership exceeds 50% of charter capital BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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While the majority of foreign subsidiaries in Russia belong to private foreign banks, 
public-sector banks of other nations
8 and international financial institutions
9 are also 
shareholders. In order to arrive at a more consistent breakdown by form of ownership, we 
must add the market shares of subsidiaries of foreign public-sector banks and international 
financial institutions to the share of the local public sector. 
Public sector banks often form pyramid-like vertical holding structures, whereby the 
state entity controls the bank at the top, which in its turn controls several (nominally inde-
pendent and private) banks below it. For example, the state-controlled natural gas monop-
oly Gazprom controls Gazprombank, which has several subsidiary banks with their own 
subsidiaries. The same goes for the Russia’s second-largest bank, government-owned 
VTB. The mother bank owns nine banks in eight countries in Europe and CIS countries. 
Several of those banks, in turn, have subsidiaries in Russia (e.g. Evrofinance-Mosnarbank). 
The ownership structures described above blur the boundaries between public and 
private sectors. The influence of private banks on the state goes beyond traditional “state 
capture,” implying the involvement of private interests in shaping formal institutions. 
Business interests strive to control financial assets and flows that nominally remain under 
the ownership of the state. This may be an element of a piecemeal insider-dominated priva-
tization – but not necessarily. In certain cases, maintaining the status quo can be the most 
efficient strategy for an insider. The Law on Privatization provides for contribution of state 
assets into equity of joint-stock banks as an accepted modality of privatization, delegated 
to the authority of the respective ministry, regional, or municipal body. Such decisions 
were often taken ad hoc under pressure from vested interests and insiders. They were not 
part of any consistent strategy or development plan. The result was a large number of tiny 
banks with minority state participation. The stakes of these banks were then diluted and 
ultimately appropriated with the tacit complicity of certain state agencies, companies, and 
individual officials. This situation partly explains the lack of public outcry or demands 
from private-sector decision-makers for clear formal institutions (laws) to govern bank pri-
vatization. 
 This situation has also put insiders, particularly top management, in position to “cap-
ture” state-owned banks. While management theory suggests such an agency problem 
                                                 
8 These include Credit Lyonnais (at least until its takeover by Credit Agricole Indosuez), Westdeutsche Lan-
desbank, Bank of China, International Bank of Azerbaijan, National Bank of Uzbekistan, and Bank Melli 
Iran. Andrei V. Vernikov 
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(self-dealing by top management) should not exist in the public sector as it should be fairly 
straightforward for the state to replace opportunistic top managers, the reality in Russia is 
that the state has trouble with bank oversight due to the thinness of managerial resources 
and a lack of competent supervisors. As a result, top bank managers enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy and can leverage their power against individual officials and selected wings of 
government. In addition, state-owned banks pay lower dividends on average than other 
state enterprises, suggesting the state takes its role as a shareholder differently in this case.  
“Business capture” by the state refers to expansion of the state’s influence over pri-
vate banks that behave like public sector entities. Dozens of banks not formally owned by 
the state remain under decisive influence from state bodies and individual officials, espe-
cially at regional and municipal levels. Influence can be exercised via a “golden share,” 
participation on the board of directors,
10  networking, and direct political intervention in 
decision-making. Private banks have even been taken over directly by public sector banks. 
For example, Vneshtorgbank took over the failed Guta-Bank in 2004 and the viable Prom-
stroybank in 2005.
11  
The Russian state expects private banks to demonstrate enthusiasm and involvement 
in solving socio-economic problems at the macro level. Pursuit of profit maximization per 
se is deemed as socially unenlightened. Thus, bureaucrats push private banks to allocate 
funds along centrally-approved guidelines (including the much-touted national priority 
projects to improve healthcare, education, agriculture, and housing). When there is a dis-
crepancy between non-economic motivation and normal market motivation, the institu-
tional network can force banks to deviate from their implicit mandate to operate as effi-
cient allocators of resources to retain the loyalty of the authorities. Although loyal banks 
find themselves providing loss-making services to certain client groups and engaging in 
high-risk lending, the state seems prepared to tolerate such inefficiency on their part and 
assist them in dealing with competitive pressures. Moreover, distrust on the part of state 
regarding the willingness of independent private-sector actors to act in accord with politi-
                                                                                                                                                    
9 КМB-Bank was predominantly owned by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development until it 
was sold to a strategic foreign investor. 
10 A recent example: The administration of the Novosibirsk region accepted the dilution of its controlling 
stake at Levoberezhniy bank by new private owners in exchange for being allowed to hold on to the majority 
of seats on the bank’s board of directors [Vedomosti – Novosibirsk, 21.09.2006, No.177 (1704)]. 
11 These deals and the takeovers of several Russian subsidiary banks in Europe required considerable capital 
injections from VTB’s main owner, the government. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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cal guidelines hinder privatization of core banks and are used to justify restrictions against 
foreign investment in the banking sector. 
 
2.2   Alternative strategies of bank ownership transformation 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main features of two strategies for bank privatization implemented 
in Russia, CEE countries, China, and Vietnam.  
 
 
Table 1  Comparison of strategies for bank ownership transformation 





Improved performance of 
state-owned banks, 
maximization of revenue 
Triggered by a banking 
crisis 
 






Envisaged role of the 
government 
Withdrawal of government from 
commercial banks 
Holder of controlling stake 
in core banks 
Envisaged role of the 
national private capital 
Not targeted  Not targeted 
Envisaged role of foreign 
direct investors in 
privatized banks 
Full control over privatized banks  Junior partner; source of 
technology, capital, and 
management skills 
Envisaged role of foreign 
portfolio investors 
Some room, but rather a 
contingency option 
Junior partner of the state; a 
source of capital 
Method of privatization  Auction of controlling stake  IPO for a minority stake, an 
outright sale of minority 




Not the main driver. Sometimes 
neutral impact if costs of 
rehabilitation are included 
High, despite costs of 
rehabilitation 
Pace of privatization  Fast  Slow 
Accompanied by opening 
up of the banking sector 
Yes  Yes, but in a measured and 
gradual way Andrei V. Vernikov 
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to foreign competition 
Regime for foreign direct 
investors in “greenfield 
banks” 
Restrictive at first; liberal after 
privatization of core banks 
Selective and restrictive; 
case-by-case approach 
Part of a broader 
international integration 
effort 
Yes, EU membership is a driver of 
paramount importance 
No, except for compliance 
with WTO requirements  
Possibility of reversal 
 
No  Yes, if performance of 
banks politically 
unsatisfactory   
Institutional impact  Strong  Weak 
Countries following this 
strategy 
Czech Rep., Hungary, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Croatia, 
Bulgaria, and Romania; Poland, 
Slovenia, and Latvia to some 
extent 
China and Vietnam; Russia 
to some extent 
    
The implementation of Strategy 1 in CEE countries was usually preceded by a period 
of evolutionary change without radical restructuring of ownership. The state did not with-
draw from banks at the outset of reforms.
12 The main criterion distinguishing the two 
strategies, however, is not the pace of privatization or the share of either sector but rather 
the ultimate objective of change. Strategy 1 is an element of a broad context of transition 
toward a market system based on institutions of private ownership, competition, and eco-
nomic freedom. Despite national specifics, the bank privatization strategy was similar for 
post-socialist countries that ultimately sought EU accession. Strategy 2 has been pursued in 
China, which is sticking with the socialist paradigm, and in Russia, where privatization has 
followed a different path than that of the CEE countries. Vietnam’s direction of the bank-
ing sector reforms is surprisingly similar to China’s. 
The structure of banking sector ownership in Russia is closer to that of Vietnam than 
European transition economies (Fig.3). In Russia, the public sector and national private 
sector roughly hold equal market shares. Russia’s share of foreign-controlled banks (about 
10%) is lower than for any European transition economy, including Ukraine, which is gen-
erally regarded as lagging behind Russia in market-oriented reforms. 
 
                                                 
12  In Poland and Slovenia, this process is still not finalized. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Sources: Raiffeisen, 2006; VinaCapital, 2006; author’s calculations for Russia 
       
Comparing banking system structures in Russia and China is not a straightforward 
proposition as Chinese financial intermediation is highly diversified and embraces various 
organizational formats.
13 In the larger picture, however, it is obvious that China’s four 
state-owned banks dominate the national banking industry with a combined market share 
of 53% (compared to 41% in Russia).
14 Moreover, minority stakes in state banks have both 
countries have been sold to investors (including foreign investors) through IPOs or private 
placements. The Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China Con-
struction Bank now have minority shareholders. In Russia, some 20% of Sberbank shares 
are held by foreign portfolio investors. Russia is planning public offerings of Sberbank and 
Vneshtorgbank (and perhaps Gazprombank) shares. In both countries, the strategy is ap-
parently to maximize fiscal gains from partial privatizations, while preserving control of 
the state over core banks. Among institutional and political factors that predetermined this 
public choice, we note a willingness on the part of the state to preserve its own instruments 
for implementing industrial, social, regional, and other policies. In other words, the gov-
ernment is skeptical as to whether banks after privatization will continue to make resources 
                                                 
13 We regard urban and rural credit cooperatives as perhaps the only private establishments in the Chinese 
financial system, while practically all national banks (the core state-owned banks, regional banks, develop-
ment banks, city commercial banks, post-saving offices, etc.) are parts of the broad public sector. 
14 In Vietnam, the four main state-owned commercial banks account for around 70% of all lending activity 
(VinaCapital, 2006). Andrei V. Vernikov 
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available to companies and projects championed by bureaucrats. State officials are even 
more skeptical with regard to foreign banks as potential new owners. 
Domestic private and foreign private banks are more prominent in Russia than in 
China. Russia has allowed 100%-owned foreign subsidiaries (currently 48), while China 
has limited the overall foreign stake in an individual bank to 25% and the individual stake 
of a foreign party to 20% of a bank’s capital. Russia essentially grants national treatment to 
all market participants at post-investment stage, while China applies an elaborate set of re-
strictions and extra rules to foreign banks with respect to regional branches, local and for-
eign currency, banking products, etc. 
Although Russia went farther than China in liberalizing its banking sector to private 
investors, it appears that on balance it refrained from bank privatization in favor of strate-
gic foreign investors. The prospect of the state withdrawing from core banks and yielding 
control to the private sector, domestic or foreign, is equally remote. Indeed, Russia’s strat-
egy of bank ownership transformation seems more akin to the Chinese strategy of gradual 
improvement of core banks efficiency under firm state control than the radical market-
oriented transformations of Eastern European banks. 
 
2.3 The  direction  of ownership change 
 
The withdrawal of the state from commercial banks that started in 1988 has been halting 
and limited in scope. After hitting a low in 1998, the share of public sector has risen to a 
combined market share of 44%. Much of the increase has come at the expense of the do-
mestic private sector and has entailed a crowding-out of national private banks with their 
gradual replacement by either foreign private or national state-owned organizations. This 
trend of recent years took place under conditions of high rates of economic growth and po-
litical stability. It may well be that external or domestic shocks would probably accelerate 
this trend, as witnessed in 1998-1999 and in 2004 after the local bank liquidity crisis. 
The partial privatizations of state-owned banks now under way in Russia and China 
are unlikely to produce major shifts in the macro structure of the banking system as long as 
control over core banks remains in the hands of the broad state. The incoming flows of in-
vestment, technology, and management skills that such partial privatizations trigger will 
strengthen existing banks and solidify their leadership, thus further marginalizing other BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/ 2007 
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agents. The process of acquisition of Russian private banks by foreign banks will also not 
shift the gross balance because the transformation is occurring within a discrete sector.   
Ultimately, this evolution is likely to produce a dual-component banking sector (pub-
lic sector and foreign private sector), with the public-sector component being the driving 
force. National private banks continue as second-tier players, concentrating on serving cer-
tain niches. While the emerging structure of the Russian banking sector is unique among 
transition countries, it is analogous to the design of the financial system of Russia in the 
early twentieth century before the Bolshevik regime, when the number of players was re-
stricted by high barriers to entry and the prevailing oligopolistic power in the hands of the 
main operators. Restricted competition will likely slow innovation in financial services of-
fered by banks. Large enterprises and national priority projects will receive sufficient fi-
nancing, while other sectors of the economy, especially small business, will have problems 
getting affordable bank loans. 
A departure from the described trend line in terms of ownership structure implies 
state divestment of its core banks and a shift in control to private-sector agents. In the 
short-to-medium run, such a development seems highly unlikely. The state could, however, 
try to hinder the process of takeover of private national players by foreign strategic inves-
tors. This course of policy would artificially sustain the current large number of market 
participants, but hurt the economy as a whole through high transaction costs, broad interest 
margins, and a continued lack of competition. 
The precise outcome of ownership changes resulting from a given policy is hard to 
predict. An intensification of control over foreign participation may not result in the 
strengthening of national private banks, but instead produce gaps that will be interpreted as 
market failures, justifying a preemptive action by the state through the banks it owns or 
controls. Likewise, greater public-sector participation in banking could foster state capture 
(“state privatization”), with nominally state-owned banks falling under the influence of 
groups of private interests or falling victim to opportunistic managers. Increased volumes 
of looting and embezzlement of public funds are also possible outcomes. As for foreign 
players, a dirigiste model with a prevailing public sector could diminish the attractiveness 
of the Russian market by increasing political risk and distorting price signals. 
 Andrei V. Vernikov 
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3    Institutional change in the banking sector:  
    The push to a bad equilibrium 
 
As noted in Section 2, the Russian banking system is more or less evenly split between 
public and private sectors, so neither state property nor private property represent the 
dominant form. As a result, neither type of economic actor – state-owned or private banks 
– can take the lead in shaping the rules of the game (“institutions”). They all however face 
and/or use the entire set of existing institutions, i.e. the sum of old and new institutions. 
Russia did not go as far in its institutional change as CEE countries, which essentially 
adopted the body of European law (acquis communautaire). Russia has also borrowed 
from a broad set of formal institutions to regulate relations in the financial sphere. Apart 
from an independent central bank and a two-tier banking system, there are now also agen-
cies for federal deposit insurance, credit history and credit tracking, collateral, credit rat-
ings, bankruptcy, corporate governance, anti-money-laundering, supervision of derivatives 
trading, enhancement of competition, etc. These imported institutions do not necessarily 
conform to traditional accepted norms of Russian behavior, so promoting these new trans-
planted institutions has cost society in terms additional bureaucracy. Ever-growing staff 
numbers at the central bank and other agencies that regulate the banking industry (pruden-
tial supervision, financial monitoring and anti-money-laundering, currency control, arbitra-
tion, bankruptcy courts, deposit insurance, tax authorities) indicate that banks do not abide 
voluntarily by formal institutions and are prone to opportunistic behavior.
15 Rule of law 
and equality of all economic actors clash with social networks where informal institutions 
dominate. Moreover, banking law regulates only a certain relations and transactions. Gaps 
in the law have allowed banks to systematically assist their clients in avoiding taxes, as 




                                                 
15 In the first nine months of 2006, the Central Bank of Russia pulled about 50 banking licenses. Most banks 
lost their licenses for engaging in money laundering or other criminal activities. Dozens of other banks are 
currently under investigation for similar behavior. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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3.1  Rule of law 
 
3.1.1  Non-deliverable forward contracts 
 
The case of non-deliverable forward contracts on which the Russian banks defaulted en 
masse in 1998 has been used as evidence of the deficiencies of Russian law as it failed to 
protect a society from the impacts of certain types of transactions. The specific argument is 
that the import of alien foreign institutions led to a misalignment between formal and in-
formal institutions (Kuzminov et al., 2005, p.164). The opportunistic behavior was not lim-
ited to micro-level agents, but enforcing forward contracts on Russian banks would have 
inflicted serious losses on them (and possibly bankruptcy followed by a takeover by their 
foreign counterparties). This was deemed unacceptable by Russian authorities (executive, 
judicial and others). Accordingly, the decision by the Supreme Arbitration Court No. 
5347/98 in June 1999 ruled that forward contracts were essentially wagers (Art.1062 of the 
Civil Code), which left their holders without legal protection. 
The ruling is quite extraordinary as Russian’s Civil Code (Art.12) contains provisions 
governing forward contracts. The forward contracts had clear legal basis and were entered 
into voluntarily by parties that fully understood and accepted their respective rights and 
obligations. In the event of breach, both parties had an expectation that the terms of the de-
livery could be enforced on the other party or that they were otherwise entitled to damages. 
By choosing to bypass formal institutions (civil and contract law) in favor of informal in-
stitutions, the court apparently was choosing expediency over the complexities of sorting 
out a legal train wreck. Moreover, the ruling sent the signal that in Russia contracts are en-
forced only to the extent that their enforcement is not perceived as detrimental to the 
broadly defined economic and political interests of the Russian authorities. Eight years on, 
nothing has been done to solidify the institution of derivative contracts. 
 
3.1.2  Treatment of branches of foreign banks 
 
The informal ban on foreign banks establishing branches in Russia also illustrates the 
precedence informal institution can take over formal institutions. Russian leaders, includ-
ing the president, consistently claim that foreign bank branches must not be allowed a 
foothold for reasons that include protecting the national market, ensuring “fair competi-
tion,” and fighting money laundering. Russia has no foreign bank branches and the bank Andrei V. Vernikov 
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regulator (CBR) flatly refuses to issue licenses for them. Yet Russian law explicitly pro-
vides for foreign bank branches in the Law on Banks and Banking (Art.2) and none of the 
Russian authorities seeking to ban foreign bank branches have proposed amending the law. 
This situation again exemplifies the misalignment between law and the informal norms of 
paternalistic behavior of the state when executive authorities usurp the right to determine 
what is in the national interest. Interestingly, no foreign investor has dared to challenge the 
ban in court. It reflects the perception that either it is, by definition, impossible to overrule 
the sole bank regulator, or that in case of successful arbitration the subsequent extra-legal 
impact from the regulator will render the new banking operation unviable. Instead, foreign 




Russia spent over 70 years eradicating competition from all spheres of economic activity. 
This legacy partly explains why freedom of enterprise and competition are misaligned with 
the paternalism of the state and the network organization based on interpersonal links. 
Competition is viewed as destructive, unfair, undesirable, and ultimately anti-social (Av-
tonomov, 1997), and xenophobic attitudes flourish where collusion is the norm of business 
behavior. 
At the macro level, trends in the net interest margin may feature the degree of com-
petitiveness of the banking system. Drakos (2003) analyzes eleven transition economies 
during the period 1993-1999, finding narrowing interest margins with the lowest levels 
registered by state-owned banks. A cross-country comparison suggests that the size of the 
net interest margin is negatively correlated with the share of foreign capital in the banking 
sector (Vernikov, 2005). In contrast, the average interest margin in Russia remains broad 
(see Table 2), while return on average capital in the banking sector has steadily grown to 
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Table 2   Bank interest rates in Russia, % 
Year  1999 2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 
Deposit rate  13.68  6.51  4.85  4.96  4.48  3.79  3.99  3.87 
Lending rate  39.72  24.43  17.91  15.71  12.98  11.40  10.68  10.72 
Interest margin  26.04  17.92  13.06  10.75  8.50  7.61  6.69  6.85 
* January-June 2006 
Source: IMF, pp.814-815. 
 
 
Drobyshevsky and Paschenko (2006) apply a methodology from industrial economics 
(the Bresnahan and Barros-Modesto models) to the Russian banking sector to explain why 
average indicators of competitiveness are misleading. Despite a large number of partici-
pants (1,215 banks in Russia), the market is highly segmented and the degree of monopoli-
zation varies across segments. The markets for household deposits and corporate banking 
for a select range of viable clients (mainly raw material exporters and natural monopolies) 
are the most competitive and are dominated by state-owned banks. Other market segments 
typically have lower intensity of competition and a higher number of participants. 
 
3.3 Deposit  insurance 
 
There appears to be only minor additional benefit from introducing the institution of de-
posit insurance into the banking sector dominated by state-owned banks enjoying de facto 
guarantees of performance from the state. When a comprehensive deposit insurance 
scheme was introduced in Russia in 2005, some 70% of household deposits were held by 
public sector banks, primarily Sberbank. The introduction of deposit insurance simply 
converted an implicit state guarantee into explicit protection, removed some agents from 
the household deposit market. It did practically nothing to discipline qualified market par-
ticipants. Indeed, the major change since implementation of the scheme has been an inflow 
of deposits into new private accounts at national private banks offering high interest rates, 





 Andrei V. Vernikov 
 
Russia's banking sector transition: Where to? 
 
 
  22 
3.4 Bankruptcy 
 
The structure of the institution of bankruptcy includes not only legislation and its enforce-
ment, but also out-of-court mechanisms and the possibility for economic agents to apply 
several interpretations of the law (Podkolzina, 2006). Bankruptcy in Russia often serves as 
a tool for hostile takeover or seizure of assets rather than its classical role of ensuring or-
derly work-out procedure enhancing overall economic efficiency. So far banks have 
avoided hostile takeovers and bank failures have been worked out by a government entity 
(initially ARKO, currently the Deposit Insurance Agency) that has given priority to private 
individual depositors and the state over corporate claimholders. 
 
3.5 Corporate governance 
 
Russia has borrowed its models for formal institutions of corporate governance from vari-
ous developed market economies (Puffer & McCarthy, 2004; Radygin et al., 2004; Kape-
lyushnikov, 2005). The shaping of a national model of corporate governance in the bank-
ing sector is hindered by the high degree of property concentration. The sheer number of 
banks registered in the legal form of “open joint-stock companies” (public companies) is 
misleading. Shares of an absolute majority of “joint-stock company” bank are not publicly 
traded. Thus, there is no single corporation in the banking sector with a sufficiently dis-
persed ownership structure. Each organization is typically led by a blockholder that over-
sees in the operational management. Naturally, such a blockholder sees little need for the 
mechanisms of corporate governance to protect their interests. In the absence of dynasty-
run banking businesses in Russia, the role of blockholders is performed by single private 
individuals, a tightly-related group of individuals, or the state. Sberbank has the most di-
versified ownership structure among banks, despite the presence of the Central Bank of 
Russia as the leading blockholder with a 60.6% capital stake and a 63.8% voting share. 
Sberbank stock is actively traded on the stock exchange. 
Most banks have no unaffiliated minority shareholders. If there is a pool of minority 
shareholders, they typically keep a low profile. Practical workings of legal institutions of 
corporate governance leave little chance to minorities to make an impact on strategic deci-
sion-making. Foreign strategic investors do not rely on the institutional framework in Rus-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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sia and avoid buying minority stakes without a solid call option for the controlling stake.
16 
The share of foreign capital contributions into 100%-owned subsidiary banks in the total 
amount of foreign capital contributions in the Russian banking sector fell from 82.6% to 
73.7% during January-October 2006, reflecting both an improved perception of the institu-
tional environment and a large acquisition by the French Société Générale of a minority 
share with an option to buy the controlling stake in Rosbank. Unlike in most CEE coun-
tries, foreign investment in Russia has so far failed to produce a change in the national 
model of corporate governance among Russian banks. Foreign bank subsidiaries are stand-
alone corporations only nominally; they actually represent organizational units of global 
structures and are governed as branches of parent banks, not independent corporations 
(Vernikov, 2005, pp.186-199). 
The model of corporate governance based on highly-concentrated property entails the 
problem of entrenchment of the blockholder against other shareholders. To entrench itself 
and retain control, the state as blockholder develops pyramid-shaped holding structures 
with a broad foundation and narrow summit (Kapelyushnikov, 2005), e.g. a network of 
subsidiaries and affiliated banks with their own subsidiaries and affiliates.   
 
3.6  The direction of institutional change 
 
Development of market-economy institutions has passed from an initial stage of brisk re-
form to slow incremental change. The danger today is an institutional trap created by the 
prevailing equilibrium between “old” and “new” institutions. Winners from partial reform 
and partial privatization of banks now have incentive to invest resources in preserving the 
status quo (Yakovlev, 2004). Moreover, existing agents have a relatively low demand for 
law and high-quality institutions (Yakovlev, 2006). Weak state and imperfect markets do 
not promote proper function of market institutions, and the traditional institutions of hier-
archical subordination and centralization are permitted to survive. This bad equilibrium 
suppresses innovation and competition and fosters inefficiency. State banks, not being 
wholly subject to market discipline, fortify their oligopolistic position and maximize their 
“profits” at the expense of the economy as a whole.  
                                                 
16 The experiences of the EBRD and IFC in 1998-1999 provided a hard lesson that a minority stake in a large 
Russian bank does not necessarily provide the right to participate in control of the bank or even access to 
complete information about the bank’s financial condition. Several authors have considered the threshold for Andrei V. Vernikov 
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In our opinion, competition between institutions in the Russian banking sector favors 
“old” institutions backed by a vast reserve of public property. Today’s creeping renation-
alization of the banking sector promotes the shifting of the institutional equilibrium away 
from market institutions toward traditional networks. Interestingly, this situation forces the 
transition researcher to consider the question of how market institutions might function 
when state property returns to dominate the banking sector. We know banking is a factor of 
development provided that there is no overwhelming command force in control of the 
socio-economic process (Schumpeter, 1961). Moreover, old institutions are likely to ab-
sorb new institutions and force them to function in a fashion other than envisioned.
  Breaking out of this bad equilibrium will require that the state, the only actor 
strong enough to implement change, take an active role in active institutional and structural 
reforms. On the other hand, there is considerable political resistance to privatization of 
core banks. 
The revamp of the banking sector in CEE countries involved actor imports, 
whereby a critical mass of banking market participants were “imported” to populate the 
new institutional setup (Vernikov, 2005). Accession for EU membership and the harmoni-
zation of national laws do not fully explain why CEE countries pursued bank privatization 
strategies with such rigor. Countries that joined the EU prior to CEE membership (e.g. 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece) also liberalized their banking sectors, but to nowhere near the 
same degree. Bank privatizations were extended over a long period of time and no prefer-
ence was given to foreign investors. We believe that the institutional paradigm provides an 
explanation to CEE banking phenomenon. Thus, while mass-scale import of foreign actors 
worked for CEE countries, it is likely not feasible for Russia. 
                                                                                                                                                    
control over a bank in a transition economy (Grigoryan, Manole, 2002; Bonin et al., 2005) and the interplay 
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4   Conclusions 
 
We draw five overarching conclusions from the above analysis:  
 
•  The withdrawal of the Russian State from commercial banking sector has been in-
consistent and limited in scope. Core banks were not subject to privatization. Since 
the 1998 crisis the share of public sector banks in total assets has expanded and 
reached 44%, or roughly the same share as domestic private sector.  
 
•  Partial privatizations may not produce large shifts in the structure of the banking 
system when the state retains control over four core banks. Instead, the incoming 
flows of investment, technology, and management skills reinforce the dominant po-
sition of state-controlled banks. As a result, Russia’s strategy for banking sector 
development has more in common with the Chinese strategy than with the course 
of reforms implemented in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
•  Creeping renationalization of banks threatens to create a leading public sector 
backed by a strong, but loyal, foreign sector and a weak, eroding domestic private 
sector. The result in the medium term would be an imperfect, intervened market 
with insufficient competition. 
 
•  Institutions imported to regulate finance and banking (rule of law, competition, 
corporate governance, deposit insurance, bankruptcy, confidentiality, etc.) clash 
with traditional norms and in most cases cannot beat the competition. This creates a 
bad equilibrium between old and new institutions that favors non-market patterns 
of centralized allocation and redistribution and suppression of competition. This 
bad equilibrium trap is typical of an economy that has only managed to implement 
partial reforms. 
 
•  Demand for high quality institutions is limited. Many economic agents have devel-
oped strong vested interests in maintaining the current setup. Some private banks 
have learned to survive (and benefit from) paternalism and state intervention. Bank 
owners that cannot adapt must sell their property and exit the market. Andrei V. Vernikov 
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Departure from what we tentatively see as a baseline scenario will require an active role of 
the state, primarily via privatization of core banks and enhancement of competition. Ironi-
cally, the likelihood of progress toward a healthier arrangement is contingent on its politi-
cal feasibility. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3   Russian public sector banks, 01.01.2006 
Bank  Blockholder  Assets, RUB million  Market share,% 
Sberbank  CBR – 60.6%  2 500 820  25.6% 
Vneshtorgbank group,  of which  Federal government  3 967 238  8.4% 
VTB   Federal government  632 034  6.5% 
Promstroybank VTB  139 515  1.4% 
Bank VTB 24  VTB  43 591  0.4% 
Gazprombank  Gazprom JSC  434 585  4.5% 
Bank Moskvy  City of Moscow  216 693  2.2% 
sub-total (“Big Four”)    3 923 647  40.7% 
Ak Bars group (incl. Naratbank)  Tatarstan government  70 704  0.7% 
Rosselkhozbank  Federal government  63 002  0.6% 
Khanty-Mansiyskiy  Regional government  50 538  0.5% 
Transkreditbank  Russian Railways JSC  47 749  0.5% 
Evrofinans-Mosnarbank VTB  44  376  0.5% 
Tatfondbank  Tatarstan government  20 733  0.2% 
Rossiyskiy bank razvitiya  Federal government  17 631  0.2% 
VBRR Rosneft  17  454  0.2% 
Gazenergoprombank Gazprombank  13  854  0.1% 
Bank Orenburg  Orenburg regional govt.  4 915  0.1% 
Sovfintrade Gazprombank  4  809  0.0% 
Almazergienbank  Alrosa JSC  4 351  0.0% 
Mezhdunarodny akcionerniy  Federal government (68%)  4 186  0.0% 
Krayinvestbank  Krasnodar regional govt.  4 110  0.0% 
Moskovskoe ipotechnoe agentstvo  City of Moscow  3 654  0.0% 
Novokuznetsky municipalny  Municipal authorities  3 504  0.0% 
Roseximbank Vnesheconombank  3  258  0.0% 
Municipalny kamchatprofitbank  Regional government  2 075  0.0% 
Novosibirsky municipalny  Municipal authorities  1 834  0.0% 
Sibsotsbank  Altay regional government  1 414  0.0% 
Chuvashkreditprombank  Regional government  1 370  0.0% 
Moskva-City  City of Moscow  909  0.0% 
Khakassky municipalny  Municipal authorities  572  0.0% 
Yoshkar-Ola 
Mariy-El regional government 
(71%) 525  0.0% 
Onego Karelia  regional  government  491  0.0% 
Rinvestbank  Ryazan regional government  411  0.0% 
Ivanovskiy oblastnoy  Ivanovo regional government  336  0.0% 
Total    4 356 130  44.7% 
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